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Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus
Opposite-Sex, Unmarried Couples in Domestic
Partnership Laws and Ordinances∗
Terry S. Kogan∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Efforts to enact domestic partnership schemes like that embodied
in chapter 6 of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
are faced with a fundamental question as to the proper scope of coverage. Motivated in part by a desire to provide marital-like benefits
to same-sex couples who lack full marriage rights, drafters of these
schemes must decide whether to include opposite-sex couples within
the schemes’ ambit. The purpose of this article is to explore the
competing ways in which various approaches to domestic partnership
laws treat opposite-sex, unmarried couples in comparison to samesex couples. An important social and ethical question underlies this
inquiry: Are there relevant differences that would justify treating opposite-sex, unmarried couples differently from same-sex couples?
I identify three different approaches to this issue. The first approach, which I term the Leveling Position, treats same-sex couples
more favorably than it treats opposite-sex, unmarried couples by offering domestic partnership benefits only to the former.1
The second approach, which I term the Equality Position, treats
same-sex couples and opposite-sex, unmarried couples identically in
granting domestic partnership benefits. This is the position taken by
the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, under consideration at this conference.2
∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on February 1, 2001.
∗∗ Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, S.J. Quinney College of
Law, University of Utah.
1. See generally James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic
Partnerships to Same-Sex Couples, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 649 (1998).
2. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS &
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) §§ 6.01–6.06 [hereinafter
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Finally, the third approach, which I term the Moralistic Position,
condemns domestic partnership schemes in general and, in doing so,
treats opposite-sex, unmarried couples more favorably than same-sex
couples.3 Specifically, the Moralistic Position insists that the only relationship between opposite-sex couples worthy of state recognition
is the marital relationship. At the same time, because it condemns
homosexuality, the Moralistic Position opposes any state recognition
of same-sex relationships whatsoever. Not only does it oppose extending marriage rights to same-sex couples; the Moralistic Position
also opposes the state’s recognizing same-sex relationships through
any other statutory or regulatory program, including domestic partnership schemes. Accordingly, while opposite-sex couples are encouraged to marry, same-sex couples are effectively encouraged to
disappear from the state’s visage. In discussing the Moralistic Position, I will of necessity have to step away from domestic partnership
schemes and discuss the issue of marriage rights for same-sex couples
more directly.
I will examine these approaches from several perspectives. First, I
will ask whether the justification offered by each makes sense in light
of a fundamental goal of family law: Does the approach tend to foster stable, long-term, mutually supportive, committed relationships
between two people that are conducive to rearing children in a financially sound environment?4 Second, I will ask how each approach
fares in terms of principles of fairness and equality, principles critical
to our constitutional democracy. Finally, I will examine each position

PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4)]. See also Dee Ann Habegger, Living in Sin and the Law:
Benefits for Unmarried Couples Dependent upon Sexual Orientation?, 33 IND. L. REV. 991
(2000).
3. I associate this position most closely with the writings of Lynn Wardle of Brigham
Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, A Critique of the
ALI’s Effort to Redefine “Family” by Increasing the Relationships Given Marital and Parental
Status, 2001 BYU L. REV. (2001); see also Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L.
REV. 735 (1998) [hereinafter Wardle, Redefining Marriage].
4. Carl Schneider has described this function of family law more generally as the channeling function. See, e.g., CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO
FAMILY LAW: PROCESS, PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 200 (2d ed. 2000) (“[F]amily law
may . . . be said to try to discourage harmful behavior within families, to encourage happiness
in intimate relationships, and to promote social stability by establishing, promoting and channelling people into social institutions that seem to conduce to those goals and by channelling
people away from social institutions that seem to disserve them.”); see also Carl E. Schneider,
The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992).
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from the viewpoint of a gay rights advocate and ask whether the approach is a wise strategic position in furthering the civil rights of gay
and lesbian people in our society.
This leads me to a final introductory point. I want to make my
underlying position clear from the outset. Though this paper focuses
on domestic partnership issues, because of the centrality of chapter 6
of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution to this conference, it is my strong belief that nothing less than full marriage
rights should be extended to same-sex couples. Accordingly, all domestic partnership schemes, including that embodied in chapter 6 of
the ALI Principles, must be seen as second-best solutions, as but a
way station on the road to full marriage rights for gay and lesbian
people. This is not to condemn domestic partnership schemes outright. In our second-best world, loving gay couples may have to
make do, at least for the present, with the lesser rights given them by
such schemes. But we should not lose sight of the ultimate fair
goal—full, equal marriage rights.
With this background, let us first consider domestic partnership
schemes in general and then examine each of the three positions
identified above.
II. DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP SCHEMES
Modern domestic partnership schemes have been adopted by
public entities and by private businesses. They have been motivated
by two developments. First, the extent of cohabitation between unmarried adults has been on a steady rise for decades.5 Second, gay
and lesbian couples have in the recent past been more willing to be
open about their relationships as our society has gained a greater tolerance for the civil rights of minority groups in general. The greater
presence of nontraditional couples in our society has led public and
private entities to consider extending a range of benefits, normally
reserved to married couples, to unmarried couples.6

5. “Unmarried couples comprise nearly 3 million of the United State’s [sic] 93 million
households. This represents an increase greater than 400% over the past thirty years.” Jonathan
Andrew Hein, Caring for the Evolving American Family: Cohabiting Partners and Employer
Sponsored Health Care, 30 N.M. L. REV. 19, 20 n.12 (2000). The number of unmarried couples living together has increased from 1.6 million in 1980 to 4.1 million in 1997. See U.S.
DEP’T OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1998, Table 66 (118th ed.
1998).
6. The recent passage of a range of domestic partnership schemes in the United States
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All domestic partnership schemes provide fewer rights than those
currently provided by marriage. To begin with, state and municipally
sponsored domestic partnership programs cannot grant the full range
of federal rights now granted to married couples,7 and federal passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)8 strongly suggests that
Congress is unlikely to extend such federal rights to same-sex couples anytime soon, irrespective of what may happen at the state level.
The most extensive rights granted by a domestic partnership scheme
are those embodied in Vermont’s Civil Union Act,9 which extends to
same-sex couples who enter into formal civil unions and remain in
Vermont “all the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, . . . as are granted to spouses in a marriage.”10 Hawaii’s Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act11 provides more limited benefits to samesex couples (unmarried, opposite-sex couples are ineligible), including funeral leave for state employees, hospital visitation rights, health
insurance coverage for partners of state employees, and the ability to
claim an elective share of a partner’s estate. At the other end of the
spectrum are domestic partnership schemes that allow only for registration of a domestic partnership with a municipal agency—largely a
symbolic act.12
parallels similar moves in other countries extending a range of rights to same-sex couples. As
noted by Barbara Cox:
Today, Denmark (1989), Norway (1993), Greenland (1994), Sweden (1995), Iceland (1996), the Netherlands (1998), and France (1999) recognize same-sex unions
through “registered partnerships.” Additionally, Australia treats the long-term partners of gay men and lesbians the same as spouses for immigration purposes, and
Canada, Israel, Namibia, South Africa, the Czech Republic, Spain, and Hungary
recognize such relationships for a variety of purposes.
Barbara J. Cox, “The Little Project”: From Alternative Families to Domestic Partnerships to
Same-Sex Marriage, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 81 (2000) (citations omitted).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 2000). The United States General Accounting Office
has concluded that 1,049 federal laws providing for benefits depend on marital status—benefits
including favorable tax treatment, Social Security benefits, child support enforcement, Medicare and Medicaid, housing benefits, veteran’s benefits, and federal employment benefits.
United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, Jan. 31, 1997, at 2 (Fed. Doc. Clearing
House 1996), cited in Cox, supra note 6, at 77 n.68.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 2000).
9. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201–07 (Supp. 2000).
10. Id. § 1202(a).
11. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (2000).
12. Domestic partnership registry schemes have been adopted in, among other municipalities, New York, Atlanta, San Francisco, Denver, Milwaukee, and Seattle. One commentator
noted:
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This paper is concerned with domestic partnership schemes created by public entities (irrespective of the extent of benefits offered).
This concern is motivated by the fact that a public entity’s decision
to adopt such benefits carries with it significant symbolic meaning.
In effect, the adoption of a domestic partnership scheme places the
state’s stamp of approval on the form of relationship covered by the
benefits program.13 In particular, public recognition of same-sex relationships not only sends a message to the broader society, but also
provides a symbol for the couple themselves that their relationship is
worthy enough to deserve state recognition and benefits. Moreover,
the extension of domestic partnership benefits by a public entity to
nontraditional couples embodies a commitment by that society to
values of fairness, tolerance, and diversity. Though the decision of a
private entity to extend domestic partnership benefits can send a
similar message, most private entities justify their extending such
benefits as largely profit driven, as one way of attracting the best employees in a highly competitive market.14 This type of justification
has little relevance in the public setting.
Most of the domestic partner registries adopted so far are fairly similar. These ordinances provide for a structure or registration, as well as dissolution of the partnerships. Although many of the ordinances provide no benefit beyond the ability to declare themselves domestic partners openly and publicly, some do provide access to
city services (like prison/hospital visitation) and benefits correspondent to those offered to the spouses of city employees.
Heidi Eischen, For Better or Worse: An Analysis of Recent Challenges to Domestic Partner
Benefits Legislation, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 527, 530 (2000).
13. See, e.g., id., at 532 (“On a public level, domestic partner statutes and ordinances
may send an important message—that the municipality or state that one lives in supports its
community of same-sex couples.”). Carl Schneider has described the use of family law to convey symbolic messages as its expressive function. See SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 4, at
202. See also Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 991 (1989); Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 BOSTON C. L. REV. 265, 272 (2000) (addressing
the “expressive function” of family law).
14. As noted by Barbara Cox:
As of October 1, 1999, over 3500 organizations in the United States have domestic
partner benefits, and additional organizations are being added to this group at a rate
of two or three per week. Currently, twenty-three percent of organizations with over
5000 employees provide health benefits to domestic partners. Additionally, thirteen
percent of employers with 1000 to 4999 employees and twelve percent of employers
with 200 to 999 employees provide domestic partner health benefits.
Cox, supra note 6, at 82 (citations omitted). With respect to domestic partnership benefits
adopted by private entities, see generally, Nancy J. Knauer, Domestic Partnership and SameSex Relationships: A Marketplace Innovation and a Less than Perfect Institutional Choice, 7
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 337 (1998).
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III. THREE APPROACHES TO DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP SCHEMES

A. The Leveling Position
Let us begin by examining the Leveling Position, which treats
same-sex couples more favorably than opposite-sex couples in domestic partnership schemes by granting such benefits only to the
former. The major justification relied upon by “Levelers” for this
disparate treatment is that opposite-sex, unmarried couples have the
legal right to marry, while same-sex couples do not. Offering samesex couples domestic partnership benefits enables them to approximate those benefits they would have were they given the right to
marry—a “leveling of the playing field” approach.15
But some Levelers look beyond this difference in marriage rights
offered to these two groups by also examining the motivations of
opposite-sex, unmarried couples in making their decision not to
marry. For example, James Donovan condemns the decision of such
opposite-sex couples not to marry:
Unmarried heterosexual couples claiming status as domestic
partners seek the economic benefits of marriage without the social
responsibilities. Achieving this end would require that marriage obligations become independent of marriage rewards, whereas presently marriage implies that duties entail rewards. . . .
. . . [I]t is a lowering of that institution [marriage] in status and
prestige. As such, heterosexual domestic partnerships transgress the
higher principle of preserving marriage in its present status, and on
this basis their encouragement should be judged antisocial. Those
who desire the benefits of marriage, and are able to marry, should
get married.16

For Levelers, opposite-sex, unmarried couples employ domestic
partnership schemes to gain the benefits of marriage while avoiding
its obligations, and, in doing so, they denigrate the institution of
marriage. In contrast, for same-sex couples, domestic partnership
schemes are but a temporary remedy for the failure of the larger soci15. See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 1, at 657 (“Same-sex-only domestic partnerships are
an effort to balance the scales in the arena of domestic relations. To include heterosexuals
would preserve their significant advantage by giving them two options where [gays] would
have only the one.”).
16. Id. at 657.
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ety to extend full marriage rights to them.
Let us examine the Leveling Position along the parameters suggested above: goals of family law, fairness and equality, and gay
rights. What proves interesting about this position is that its advocates (who strongly support gay rights) are, at best, lukewarm supporters of domestic partnerships schemes. Marriage is the desired relationship; domestic partnerships are a temporary remedy and one
that should be open only to those who are unfairly excluded from
the opportunity to marry. As Donovan explains, “[H]eterosexual
domestic partnerships threaten to undermine the status of
marriage . . . .”17 He continues, “[w]hen marriage becomes an option for same-sex couples, then domestic partner benefits for samesex couples should immediately terminate.”18
Thus, in terms of the family law goal of fostering long-term, stable relationships, Levelers believe that the domestic partnership alternative is clearly inferior to marriage. Their arguments for supporting domestic partnership schemes at all evolve from a commitment
to values of fairness and equality.
Despite this seeming commitment to fairness and equality, however, the Leveling Position has inherent within it a form of discrimination based on sexual orientation—albeit a discrimination that favors gay and lesbian people. This aspect of the Leveling Position has
not gone unnoticed. In Foray v. Bell Atlantic,19 the plaintiff alleged
that an employee benefits plan adopted by NYNEX that extended a
range of benefits to same-sex domestic partners, but not to oppositesex partners, violated his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.20 He asserted that, but for the fact that he is male and
his domestic partner is female, he met all of the criteria for receiving
benefits under the NYNEX plan. He asserted, “[A]ll things being
equal, if Foray’s gender were female, he would be entitled to claim
his domestic partner as an eligible dependent under the benefits
plan.”21 The court in effect adopted the Leveling Position’s rationale
in rejecting Foray’s arguments:

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 665.
Id. at 667.
56 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
See id. at 328–29.
Id.
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Plaintiff’s claim that he was treated different from similarly situated
persons of the opposite sex depends on the assumption that a similarly situated woman is one who has a female domestic partner.
However, a woman with a female domestic partner is differently
situated from plaintiff in material respects because under current
law, she, unlike plaintiff, is unable to marry her partner. A woman
and her same-sex domestic partner, unlike plaintiff and Ms.
Muntzner, will never be eligible for a host of benefits available to
opposite-sex couples who are able to marry.22

A similar claim was raised in Cleaves v. City of Chicago.23 In that
case, an employee was fired for, among other reasons, calling in sick
on the death of his fiancé’s father, claiming that his “father-in-law”
had died. He alleged illegal sex discrimination under Title VII because had he been “an unmarried woman, rather than an unmarried
man, the City would have granted him paid leave due to the death of
the father of his female domestic partner” under the City’s Domestic
Partner Benefits Eligibility Ordinance.24 In rejecting this argument,
the court concluded that the only discrimination involved was based
on marital status, which was not protected by Title VII:
[T]he Ordinance does not involve treating men less favorably than
women on the basis of marital status, but only treating unmarried
same-sex couples differently from unmarried opposite-sex couples.
It treats men and women exactly the same: if Mr. Cleaves’ nonmarital partner were male and they otherwise met the criteria for
domestic partnership, he would have been eligible for any benefits
available to same-sex female couples . . . . The Ordinance is therefore legal discrimination on the basis of marital status, not sex discrimination involving discrimination against men (or women) because of marital status.25

In effect, the court also adopted the Leveling Position, focusing
on the fact that same-sex couples have no opportunity to marry. It is
worth noting that the plaintiff in Cleaves did not assert that he was
discriminated against based on his heterosexual orientation.26 Courts
have long held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
is not protected under Title VII, and this conclusion was recently re22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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inforced by a decision of the Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.27
Nonetheless, assuming Levelers are committed to principles of
gender equality and fairness—principles that view discrimination
based on sexual orientation and gender identity to be as egregious as
discrimination based on a person’s sex—they should be extremely
wary of endorsing any governmental program, however favorable to
same-sex couples, that relies on sexual orientation discrimination.
Gay people have too often been the brunt of such discrimination,
and we should be the last to rely on a person’s sexual orientation as a
basis for denying him or her governmental benefits.
How does the Leveling position fare from the viewpoint of advancing the long-term interests of gay and lesbian people? While the
Leveling Position may at first blush seem attractive to gay rights advocates, this approach toward domestic partnership benefits in the
public sphere has a tendency to cordon off and stigmatize gay and
lesbian couples into a second-class status. Creating a domestic partnership status reserved solely to same-sex couples sends the unfortunate message that such relationships are fundamentally different from
and inferior to relationships between opposite-sex couples. Limiting
domestic partnership benefits to same-sex couples has the effect of
creating a “separate and unequal” status that may well impede the
long-term struggle for full marriage rights.28 Having “thrown the
bone” of domestic partnerships to gays and lesbians, a sense may develop that the electorate need go no further.

B. The Equality Position
Second, let us examine the Equality Position, which treats samesex and opposite-sex, unmarried couples identically—the approach
taken by chapter 6 of the ALI Principles.29 This position is most defensible in terms of the underlying goals of family law, in terms of
fundamental values of equality and fairness, and, finally, in terms of
the long-term interests of gay and lesbian people.

27. See Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding
that a claim alleging discrimination based solely on sexual orientation does not state a cause of
action for sex discrimination under Title VII).
28. See Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont’s Civil Unions
Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate but (Un)equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113, 123 (2000).
29. See also Habegger, supra note 2, at 1010–13.
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The justification for this approach is two-fold. The Equality Position sees no moral difference between same-sex and opposite-sex,
unmarried couples in terms of the worthiness of their relationships.
Any relationship between two unrelated, loving adults is as worthy as
any other such relationship, irrespective of the sex of the partners.
Accordingly, to the extent that a state-sponsored domestic benefits
program is made available to support relationships between unmarried couples, it should be made available to all such relationships.30
Moreover, the Equality Position considers an opposite-sex, unmarried couple’s choice to share their lives together in a cohabitation
relationship as an acceptable alternative to marriage worthy of state
recognition (whether or not marriage is to be preferred). In other
words, the equality position is willing to recognize that there is value
in relationships other than marriage. In part, this justification is
based on the notion that couples should have the freedom to determine how best to structure their own relationships, including the
freedom to determine whether or not to marry.
With respect to same-sex couples, the Equality Position recognizes the fact that although many same-sex couples would marry if
given the opportunity to do so, not all would. Some loving, committed, long-term same-sex couples consciously reject the institution of
marriage for many of the same reasons that some opposite-sex couples decide not to marry.31 Some commentators in fact view domestic partnership status as preferable to marriage. Charles Pouncey
notes:
Rather than descending from a tradition in which marriage represented the sale or acquisition of a woman by a man and his family,
domestic partnership arises from the traditions of business partner-

30. See Steven N. Hargrove, Domestic Partnership Benefits: Redefining Family in the
Work Place, 6 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 49 (1994) (“The philosophy behind domestic partnership coverage is that an employee and his or her partner are, in effect, spouses. Benefits are
made available to an employee and his or her partner just as they are available to an employee
and his or her spouse. The goals of domestic partnership coverage are those of fairness, nondiscrimination, and equality among all employees, regardless of marital status.”).
31. See, e.g., Charles R. P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and
Inequality, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 363, 376 (1998) (“Lesbian and gay domestic
partnership as an institution, however, presents opportunities for its growth and development
in response to its interactions with queer cultures, which will not be available in same-sex marriage.”); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask for: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian
Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L.
REV. 1535 (1993).
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ships. Traditional business partnerships, unlike marriage, are envisioned as relationships in which the partners are equal and owe
each other the utmost duties of care and loyalty. Therefore, domestic partnership has no necessary relationship to patriarchy or heterosexism.32

The Equality Position is further based on the reality that fewer
and fewer individuals live in a traditional family setting of a husband,
a wife, and their own children.33 Despite this fact, many nontraditional families are able to serve well the emotional, social, and financial needs of the couple and their children.34 Accordingly, the State
should be willing to support the needs of all nontraditional families
through alternative domestic partnership schemes, irrespective of the
genders of the partners at the head of such households.
This important characteristic of the Equality Position is worth
emphasizing. While not asserting that domestic partnership relationships are necessarily better than or even equivalent to the marriage
relationship, underlying the Equality Position is a belief that it is
wrong for the State in general to dictate how couples should structure their private relationships.35 Though the State may show its
preference for marriage by offering more benefits to couples who
marry, the Equality Position believes that those who choose to structure their relationships in a way other than marriage are still entitled
to have those relationships supported with respect to certain essentials: hospital visitation, health care benefits, and inheritance rights,
among others. The ALI Principles extend state support for nontraditional couples to the dissolution of the relationship by requiring that
there be an equitable distribution of assets acquired during the partnership.36
32. Pouncy, supra note 31, at 376.
33. See Habegger, supra note 2, at 1010 (suggesting that only twenty-five percent of
this nation’s households fit this traditional pattern).
34. Id.
35. Cf. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Martha Albertson Fineman,
Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & LAW 13 (2000). In her work, Fineman argues for the abolition of traditional marriage, suggesting that the state should not be supporting or fostering voluntary
adult sexual relationships through the institution of marriage, but rather should direct its laws
toward fostering relationships of need such as that between a parent and child, or an adult and
an aging parent.
36. See generally PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 2, ch. 6 (relating to
“Domestic Partners”).
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Assessing the Equality Position in terms of the family law goal of
fostering stable, long-term relationships is complicated. In contrast
to the Levelers, who admit up front that domestic partnership status
is flawed and at most a temporary solution, the Equality Position
views domestic partnerships as a viable, valid alternative to marriage.
To judge the success of this position along the lines of family law
values, one must separate same-sex from opposite-sex, unmarried
couples.
With respect to same-sex couples, the picture is relatively clear.
Given that there currently exists no opportunity to marry, a same-sex
couple seeking to formalize and gain recognition of their relationship
may have but one choice—to take advantage of a domestic partnership scheme. As a general matter, the effect of engaging in the symbolic act of gaining state recognition of their relationship is likely to
encourage a same-sex couple, their families, and their friends to take
that relationship seriously and would thereby result in a more stable,
longer-term commitment to one another. Though focusing on the
State’s recognizing same-sex marriage, Jennifer Wiggins’s discussion
of the expressive function of family law is equally applicable to the
State’s recognizing domestic partnerships:
The “story told by law” about lesbian and gay coupled, committed
relationships by the exclusion from marriage is that they do not exist or do not count. Law tells all people that lesbians and gay men
are lone individuals despite the fact that they have “familistic” relationships. This story is both false and stigmatizing. . . .
....
“Familistic” relationships and relationships of mutual dependence and support between coupled adults are good for society, as
well as the members of the relationship, and should be recognized
and supported by law.37

With respect to opposite-sex couples, the picture is blurrier. As
Margaret Brinig notes, “Cohabiting partners . . . ha[ve] less commitment to each other than do married spouses and are more likely
to think in terms of short-term rather than long-term consequences.”38 Accepting domestic partnership status as a permanent,

37. Wriggins, supra note 13, at 293, 298.
38. Margaret Brinig, Domestic Partnership: Missing the Mark, unpublished manuscript
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alternative to marriage may not foster the longevity of some relationships. Nonetheless, longevity of a relationship is but one value fostered by family law. Allowing two individuals the autonomy and
freedom to structure their relationship in a way that suits them is also
an important family law value and one which may trump longevity
for some couples.39 Moreover, as noted above, some couples choose
not to enter into the institution of marriage because of its historical
association with sexism and hierarchy in our society.40 The argument
is made that longevity is only worth striving for in a relationship of
equals and that the formal institution of marriage is not conducive to
such a relationship.41
Domestic partnership schemes inevitably are less attractive than
marriage in terms of state-derived benefits. This alone should keep
the domestic partnership alternative from siphoning off large numbers of couples from marriage. Moreover, as Mark Strasser argues,42
domestic partnership laws, such as that embodied in the proposed
Principles chapter 6 (“Principles on Domestic Partners”), tend to
equalize the obligations associated with domestic partnerships in
comparison to those associated with marriage. To the extent that a
couple cannot avoid marital obligations through the domestic partnership alternative, more couples will be likely to choose to marry. In
this sense, if more opposite-sex couples who first enter into domestic
partnerships later choose to marry, then state-sponsored domestic
partnership schemes may in fact lead to long-term, stable, committed
relationships.
The Equality Position’s major appeal is its commitment to the
values of fairness and equality. Its refusal to view any long-term couple, regardless of gender or sexual orientation, as less worthy of gov-

presented at Brigham Young University symposium on family law (2001).
39. Carl Schneider and Margaret Brinig note:
One of the most potent ideas in American law is the belief in the centrality of individual autonomy. Autonomy is not just institutionalized as a value of American law;
it is cherished as the heart of American life. Americans of all stripes believe that at
least some aspects of “private life” are not the law’s business, even though they disagree about just what aspects those are. It is thus no surprise that questions about
the scope of individual autonomy pervade and perplex family law.
SCHNEIDER & BRINIG, supra note 4, at 165.
40. See Pouncy, supra note 31.
41. See sources cited supra note 31.
42. Mark Strasser, A Small Step Forward: The ALI Domestic Partners Recommendation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1135.
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ernment benefits makes this position particularly appealing in a society that highly values equality. By rejecting hierarchies among loving
couples with respect to their worthiness for state recognition, the
Equality Position fosters fundamental values of equality and fairness.
Moreover, the Equality Position is immune from attack in those
states that have laws prohibiting discrimination based upon, among
other factors, sexual orientation and/or marital status.43
Finally, the Equality Position is supportive of the goal of furthering the rights of gay and lesbian people.44 By not cordoning off
same-sex couples into a unique status maintained solely for gay and
lesbian people, the Equality Position emphasizes the commonality
that same-sex couples have with all loving couples. Moreover, any
political attempt to repeal state-sponsored domestic partnership
status for opposite-sex couples (perhaps out of concern that it undermines marriage) will be forced to confront the fact that same-sex
couples are also covered by the domestic partnership scheme. Of
course legislators could choose to maintain such a scheme only for
same-sex couples. However, any debate on the weaknesses of domestic partnerships will inevitably force a legislature to confront directly
arguments as to the inherent unfairness of not extending full marriage rights to gay and lesbian people.

C. The Moralistic Position
Finally, let us examine the Moralistic Position, which I believe to
be the least defensible of the three positions and one that runs
counter to basic goals of family law. The Moralistic Position begins
from the premise that, to protect the institution of marriage, the
State must refuse to recognize any alternative relationships, including
domestic partnerships. To give such recognition would, in effect,
give the State’s imprimatur to such relationships, and thereby make
marriage less attractive. This position is represented by a number of
commentators. Typical is Lynne Marie Kohm’s suggestion: “[U]nder
chapter 6 of these proposals, marriage per se is no longer necessary
for intimacy and companionship to be afforded many financial and

43. See Habeggar, supra note 2, at 1007.
44. The major gay rights organizations—the Human Rights Campaign, the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund—all either support or are not opposed to including unmarried opposite-sex couples within domestic partnership schemes. See Donovan, supra note 1, at 665–66.
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legal benefits. Marriage will be downgraded, and pragmatically easier
to abandon.”45 She goes on to assert that “[d]iluted by options like
domestic partnership, the institution of marriage will suffer from being watered down, weakened, even insipid.”46 The Moralistic Position’s view that domestic partnership schemes might undermine the
institution of marriage is surely not irrational, though it does rely on
complex empirical assumptions that few seem concerned about verifying through social science research.47
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that allowing a proliferation of state-recognized, alternative relationships might in the
long run undermine marriage. As suggested throughout this paper, a
central function of family law is its channeling function—using law
to encourage couples to marry in order to foster long-term, stable,
mutually supportive relationships between two people, relationships
that provide an emotionally healthy and economically-viable setting
in which to rear children. Surely, this is a function of family law that
Moralists would endorse, and, arguably, this function is not fostered
by domestic partnership schemes.
But if Moralists truly seek to channel couples into long-term stable relationships (and on that basis refuse to recognize domestic
partnerships schemes), there is no reason not to extend marriage
rights to all couples who seek to spend their lives in long-term, stable, committed relationships and possibly raise children together—
same-sex couples as well as opposite-sex couples. Why would a position that values marriage so highly not seek to open that institution
to all couples willing to accept the rights and obligations inherent in
marriage?
The reason is clear. Marriage is not the only value important to
the Moralistic Position. It is emblematic of the Moralistic Position
that it rejects any state recognition of same-sex relationships. In fact,
based on this antihomosexual commitment,48 the Moralistic Position
45. See Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will the Proliferation and Recognition of Domestic
Partnerships Affect Marriage?, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. (forthcoming no. 1, 2001).
46. See id.
47. Margaret Brinig’s paper presented at this conference is one of the few attempts to
actually employ social science research to support the view that domestic partnership schemes
have a tendency to undermine marriage between opposite-sex couples. See Brinig, supra note
38. Brinig’s paper, which addresses only opposite-sex couples, is silent on same-sex relationships. Accordingly, her position does not fall within the Moralistic Position as defined in this
article.
48. In my view, the body of scholarship by commentators such as Lynn Wardle warrants
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not only refuses to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples. It
goes further and opposes granting second-class, domestic partnership
status to such couples. It is my contention that this antihomosexual
value ends up consuming any consistent commitment that the Moralistic Position may have to the family law goals that underlie the institution of marriage.
How does the Moralistic Position attempt to reconcile its promarriage value and its antihomosexual value? It does this through
two strategies. The first is to appeal to history and definition. The
second, more insidious strategy is to resort to overstatement and distortion. Let us examine these two strategies by focusing on the work
of Lynn Wardle.
First, let us examine his appeal to history and definition. Wardle
states:
There is no doubt that historically marriage has always referred
to the union of a man and a woman in a unique relationship of
commitment and intimacy, and that marriage today is overwhelmingly defined as a heterosexual union. . . .
....
. . . [T]he union of a man and a woman is part of the very nature and reality of the marriage relationship itself. The covenant union between a man and woman that we call marriage is unique.49

History is a frightening touchstone on which to rely for the ultimate, unchanging meaning of marriage. Historically, marriage has
meant an institution in which women were subjugated to men; historically, under miscegenation laws, marriage has meant an institution in which interracial couples were not allowed to have their loving relationships legally recognized.50 Thankfully, the historical
“meaning” of marriage has not stopped enlightened courts and legisthe description “antihomosexual.” See, e.g., Wardle, Redefining Marriage, supra note 3; Lynn
D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L.
REV. 1 (1996); Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to Marry,
1790–1990, 41 HOW. L.J. 289 (1998); Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833 (1997).
49. See Wardle, Redefining Marriage, supra note 3, at 748–49. See also David O. Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: The Case for a Vermont Marriage Amendment, 25
VT. L. REV. 61, 66–67 (2000).
50. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down state miscegenation laws
as unconstitutional).
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latures from tossing those aspects of the “definition” of marriage
onto the waste pile of other social prejudices that society has rejected.51
Because history and definition alone cannot do the trick, the second and more insidious strategy employed by the Moralistic Position
to justify denying marriage rights to same-sex couples is a strategy of
overstatement and distortion. To begin with, the Moralistic Position
grossly overstates the benefits that have come to society from the fact
that traditional marriage has been between a male and a female, and
asserts that these supposed benefits could never be achieved by samesex coupling. Again, Wardle’s writings supply numerous examples:
The nature of the relationship between two persons of the same sex
is fundamentally different than the heterosexual relationship that is
marriage. . . . [N]o other companionate relationship provides the
same great potential for benefiting individuals and society as the
heterosexual covenant union we call marriage, and that is why only
committed heterosexual unions are given the legal status of marriage. . . .
....
. . . The legal status of marriage has been reserved exclusively for
special covenant heterosexual unions because those unions are
unique and uniquely beneficial. The right to enter that unique relationship is now generally recognized to be one of the basic human
rights because that relationship is unique and uniquely important
to humanity.52

Though Wardle is effusive in his use of the word “unique” to describe opposite-sex marriage,53 his work is devoid of social science
data to support these overstated claims. Moreover, also absent from
his work is any support for the proposition that committed same-sex

51. With respect to marriage rights, other countries have moved more quickly than has
the United States in casting aside anti-homosexual prejudices concerning same-sex marriage.
On April 1, 2001, the Netherlands extended full marriage rights to same-sex couples. See
Dutch Gay Couples Prepare to Wed: First Legal Marriages to Take Place Sunday, DENV.
POST, Mar. 1, 2001, at A21, available at 2001 WL 6748047.
52. Wardle, Redefining Marriage, supra note 3, at 749–50.
53. It is surely a misdescription to use the term “heterosexual” to describe traditional
marriage. The examples are rampant of gay individuals who bowed to social pressure by marrying someone of the opposite sex, only to cause extreme unhappiness both to their spouses and
to themselves.
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couples could not also gain the identical benefits from marriage that
opposite-sex couples gain and, in turn, benefit the broader society
through their legal union.
Apart from not supporting his exaggerated claims, Wardle’s description of opposite-sex marriage simply does not match the reality
of modern society. Given current divorce rates and the rise in domestic violence, empirical data cannot possibly support the glorification
attributed by the Moralistic Position to the gendered nature of traditional marriage. Andrew Sullivan points out:
[T]oday’s marriage law is utterly uninterested in character. There
are no legal requirements that a married couple learn from each
other, grow together spiritually, or even live together. A random
woman can marry a multimillionaire of a Fox TV special and the
law will accord that marriage no less validity than a lifelong commitment between Billy Graham and his wife. The courts have upheld an absolutely unrestricted right to marry for deadbeat dads,
men with countless divorces behind them, prisoners on death row,
even the insane.”54

At the same time, the Moralistic Position distorts the truth about
gay and lesbian people by demonizing and dehumanizing virtually
every aspect of their lives. Gays and lesbians are portrayed as dangerous, unstable, promiscuous, disease-spreading socio-paths, unable to
sustain lasting meaningful relationships and therefore unworthy of
marriage rights. A clear example is, again, set forth in the work of
Lynn Wardle. In an effort to portray gay and lesbian people as psychologically flawed, Wardle attributes a root cause of homosexuality
in modern society to the rise in divorce rates and general decline in
our society’s respect for marriage. In an attempt at armchair psychology, he states:
Many of those children of the first generation of liberal (nofault) divorce and socially accepted childbearing out of wedlock are
now of marriage age. Some may be drawn to homosexual relationships as a result of the childhood pains or fears associated with
marital failure or other family dysfunctioning. . . .

54. Andrew Sullivan, Marriage or Bust—Why Civil Unions Aren’t Enough (2001) available at http://www.andrewsullivan.com/text/hits_article.html?5,homosexuality; see also
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 62–66 (1996) (suggesting
that, in granting marriage licenses, states have never imposed requirements that the applicants
be good people or prove that they will be good spouses).
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Likewise, marital breakup sours some divorced men and women
on marriage. Among the ranks of lesbian and gay couples are many
divorced persons. They, too, may have turned to homosexual relationships after the painful experience of their own marital failure.55

Wardle is oblivious to the fact that gay people appear across societies and throughout history,56 and his attempt to tie homosexuality to the decline of the modern family is less than compelling.
In addition, the Moralistic Position turns a blind eye to the fact
that millions of children are currently being reared in families by
same-sex couples, children who have the same need for the state to
recognize and support their parents’ relationships as do children being reared by opposite-sex couples.57 Though the Moralistic Position
grandstands the importance of marriage, its antihomosexual agenda
keeps it from acknowledging that extending its bounds to all couples
who seek to fulfill its underlying purposes would only strengthen the
institution of marriage. Though the rhetoric of family values runs
throughout the Moralistic Position, it is one of the least familyoriented movements in the history of family law.
So how does the Moralistic Position fare along the three parameters we have been examining? In terms of the channeling function of
family law aimed at fostering long-term, stable relationships, the
Moralistic Position is an abysmal failure. Its antihomosexual commitment blinds it to the fact that extending marriage rights to gay
people would only enhance the possibility that same-sex couples
would remain committed to one another for much longer periods of
time than has been the norm in the gay community.58 Moreover, the
idea that somehow extending marital rights to same-sex couples will
result in fewer opposite-sex couples choosing to marry is groundless.
55. Wardle, Redefining Marriage, supra note 4, at 764.
56. See JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY:
GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY 41–59 (1980) (arguing that gay people have existed throughout history).
57. “Approximately three million gay men and lesbians in the United States are parents,
and between eight and ten million children are raised in gay or lesbian households.” Developments—Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1629 (1989) (citing ABA
Annual Meeting Provides Forum for Family Law Experts, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1512, 1513
(Aug. 25, 1987)).
58. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 54, at 71 (“Getting married signals a significantly
higher level of commitment, in part because the law imposes much greater obligations on the
couple and makes it much more of a bother and expense to break up. . . . Moreover, the duties
and obligations of marriage directly contribute to interpersonal commitment.”).
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With respect to the values of fairness and equality, the Moralistic
Position posits differences between same-sex and opposite-sex unmarried couples and then urges that these differences are grounds for
not allowing same-sex couples to marry. For example, Wardle suggests that same-sex relationships are inherently nonmonogamous:
“Obviously, sexual relations between persons of the same gender are
different from sexual relations between male-female couples. But that
is not the only difference. For instance, sexual fidelity is not an expected or typical characteristic in same-sex relationships, especially
among gay men.”59
He uses this as an argument for not extending marriage rights to
gay men. (It’s less than clear how Wardle moves from this argument
to an argument that lesbians also should not be allowed to marry.)
Having pointed out that no state investigates an individual’s character or suitability for marriage before issuing a marriage license, Andrew Sullivan offers a telling response to Wardle:
Even if you concede that gay men—being men—are, in the aggregate, less likely to live up to the standards of monogamy and commitment that marriage demands, this still suggests a further question: Are they less likely than, say, an insane person? A straight man
with multiple divorces behind him? A murderer on death row? A
president of the United States? The truth is, these judgments simply cannot be fairly made against a whole group of people. We do
not look at, say the higher divorce and illegitimacy rates among African Americans and conclude that they should have the right to
marry taken away from them. In fact, we conclude the opposite:
It’s precisely because of the high divorce and illegitimacy rates that
the institution of marriage is so critical for black America. So why is
that argument not applied to homosexuals?60

Even if an identifiable group of people in our society were shown
to have higher divorce or illegitimacy rate, nonetheless we would
consider it a horrendous violation of human rights to prohibit such
persons from marrying, believing that all should have the opportunity to take advantage of this fundamental human right.61 The argu59. Wardle, Redefining Marriage, supra note 3, at 759.
60. See Sullivan, supra note 54.
61. The Supreme Court has noted: “The freedom to marry has long been recognized as
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966).
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ment that loving gay couples should not be allowed to marry because they are more likely to be promiscuous is one we would never
allow for opposite-sex couples, irrespective of what statistics might
show. The antihomosexual value of the Moralistic Position leads it to
take what can only be described as immoral, inhuman positions when
it comes to the rights of gay people to pursue happiness and fulfillment in their lives, pursuits fundamental to our society.
Finally, with respect to the consideration of gay rights, little need
be said. It is the homophobic rhetoric of the Moralistic Position that
has led so many people in our country to ignore the truth of the lives
of gay and lesbian people.62
IV. CONCLUSION
In the end, perhaps the Moralistic Position is right: domestic
partnership arrangements may detract from the emphasis that our
society has traditionally given to marriage relationships. As Bruce
Hafen notes, “[L]egal marriage is more likely than is unmarried cohabitation to encourage . . . personal willingness to labor and ‘invest’
in relationships with other people, whether child or adult.”63
Unfortunately, our society has not yet met the challenge of treating all loving couples in a fair and equal manner. Currently, same-sex
couples have only the domestic partnership option available to them.
In this second-best world, it is important that the ultimate values
that motivate gay advocates to pursue extending the right to marry
to same-sex couples—fair and equal treatment before the law—also
guide decision-making along the road to that goal. So long as domestic partnership schemes are the only alternative available to samesex couples, fairness dictates that these rights be extended equally to
opposite-sex, unmarried couples. The Equality Position is, accordingly, the preferred approach for those drafting and enacting domestic partnership statutes and ordinances.

62. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327 (2000) (presenting a history of the rhetoric of antigay discourse).
63. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy:
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 490 (1983).
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